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INTRODUCTION
The idea of breaking up big tech impresses with its auda-ciousness. The last time the federal government broke up a success-ful commercial business was in 1982 when the government entered 
into a consent decree with AT&T that resulted in the creation of the “Baby 
Bells.”1 Almost 40 years later, the episode is still remembered as a high—or 
low—point for government intervention into the economy, depending on 
one’s perspective.2 Were the federal government to do what Senator Eliza-
beth Warren, among other voices on the left, argue that it should—namely, 
break up the large internet companies, like Amazon, Facebook, and Google, 
that today provide the platforms for a tremendous range of economic, social, 
and political activity in the United States—it would exercise a kind of gov-
ernment power that has very rarely been used in this country.3 Moreover, the 
result would undoubtedly represent a significant change in the economic 
relationships that govern important segments of the U.S. economy.4 That is, 
indeed, the goal.
One cannot therefore fault those who propose breaking up big tech 
for a lack of ambition. If anything, the opposite is true: The proposal is so 
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ambitious that it may be difficult for many to take seriously. This is not to 
say that one should not take it seriously. As the last few decades have clearly 
demonstrated, ideas can go from “off the wall” to “on the wall” very quickly, 
and not only when it comes to constitutional argument. Nevertheless, there 
is no question that achieving the breakup of big tech will be a difficult task 
to accomplish, particularly given the significant amounts of money pouring 
into Washington from the internet companies that are the targets of Warren 
as well as a host of other thinkers.5
It is also the case, however, that merely breaking up big tech—however 
bold, however significant in its economic repercussions—is very unlikely 
to solve many of the problems that critics associate with the emergence of 
what we might call the “platform public sphere.” This is because many of 
those problems—for example, the problem of what Shoshanna Zuboff calls 
“surveillance capitalism,”6 the problem of political disinformation,7 or the 
problems caused by often-anonymous threatening and harassing speech 
online8—are not ultimately the consequence of economic concentration. 
And yet it is economic concentration—and for the most part, only economic 
concentration—that the antitrust tool of divestiture is designed to combat. 
This is intentional. It must be remembered that one of the reasons that 
antitrust has been a favored method of economic regulation in the United 
States is precisely because it represents a limited intervention into the pri-
vate sphere. As Daniel Crane notes, a primary motivation for enacting the 
Sherman Antitrust Act was to diffuse political pressure for more radical and 
interventionist forms of economic regulation.9 Antitrust was an alternative 
to nationalization—to the regulatory mechanisms associated, that is, with 
socialism and communism. Even in the early 20th century, when the federal 
government interpreted its antitrust powers much more aggressively than it 
has in recent decades, the goal of antitrust regulation was not to fundamen-
tally reshape existing market practices but to ensure that markets functioned 
competitively.10 Antitrust law consequently has little to say about business 
practices that are neither designed to be anticompetitive nor likely to have 
a substantial anticompetitive effect.11 There is no reason to think that the 
situation will be any different today.  
The result is that, even if the federal government sued Apple or Facebook 
or Google for antitrust violations, as many have argued that it should, or went 
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so far as to break up Facebook or Google or Amazon along the lines that War-
ren has suggested, its actions would not directly impact how these or other 
big tech companies operate their platforms—the rules of access they employ, 
for example, or the control they exert over speech on their platforms, or their 
privacy policies.12 Nor would more aggressive enforcement of the antitrust 
laws against big tech do anything about what may be the most serious threat 
to the quality of public discourse in the internet public sphere: namely, the 
slow-motion destruction of the local news industry that is taking place as 
advertising dollars that once went to local newspapers and magazines flow 
instead to Facebook and Google.13  
Of course, breaking up big tech might indirectly affect at least some of 
these problems. More competition might, for example, make the big tech 
companies more sensitive to consumer demands by giving their users greater 
bargaining power when they demand changes to the existing rules. At pres-
ent, mass consumer boycotts of Amazon or Google or Facebook are hard to 
pull off because consumers have so few replacement options.14 Were these 
companies broken up along the lines that Warren has suggested, consumers 
might be better able to push them to adopt more user-protective privacy rules 
or to alter how they regulate violent and threatening speech. 
Divestiture might also limit the political power of the big tech compa-
nies and thereby make it easier for the government to regulate them in other 
ways. After all, the threat that monopolies pose to the efficient operation of 
the market is not just an economic but a political threat. Businesses that 
possess concentrated economic power also tend to possess the political pull 
to prevent regulations that threaten their profits.15 
The impact of divestiture on the relative political power of the big tech 
companies and consumers is likely to be modest, however. This is the case 
for several reasons. First, network effects—the tendency of users to continue 
to use a network because so many other people are using that network—may 
mean that, even when they have a more credible choice between platforms, 
customers are unwilling to leave Facebook or Google or other dominant 
platforms.16 Even if network efforts do not entrench the power of the big tech 
platforms, it may be the case that certain harmful practices—for example, 
the sale of user data to advertisers—are so fundamental to the business 
model of companies like Facebook and Google that they remain industry 
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standards even in a less concentrated market.17 It also is far from obvious 
that the breakup of big tech will do a great deal to diminish the political clout 
of big tech. Companies like Facebook, Amazon, and Google would, after all, 
remain large and profitable players in the internet economy, even if they were 
to be broken up along the lines that Warren suggests. This also means that 
the breakup of big tech is unlikely to do much to help the traditional news 
media outlets. Facebook, even if divested of WhatsApp, will likely remain a 
much more attractive destination for advertising dollars than the Cleveland 
Plain Dealer, say.18 
What all this means for those concerned about the quality of public 
discourse in the internet age is that the relevant question is not: Should 
Google and Amazon and Facebook be broken up? The question is instead: 
What other actions should Congress take to promote the health and vitality 
of public debate in the platform public sphere? This is not a straightforward 
question to answer because it requires taking account of not only the costs 
and benefits of different regulatory tools but also the constraints that the 
First Amendment imposes on Congress’s legislative power. 
One of the great benefits of divestiture as a regulatory tool is that it is 
almost certainly constitutional. In multiple opinions, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that legislative efforts to promote economic competition are not 
only constitutionally permissible, they actually protect many of the same 
values and interests that the Constitution protects.19 It has consequently 
tended to take a rather expansive view of the constitutional power that 
federal and state regulators possess to enforce the antitrust laws, including 
the power to divest, or break up, anticompetitive monopolies. Although 
the Court has found some constitutional limits to how broadly the antitrust 
laws extend—and that, in particular, antitrust laws cannot be interpreted to 
prohibit collective efforts to petition the government or to engage in political 
activism—a law mandating the breakup of big tech would not come anywhere 
close to those limits.20 Such a law would impose no constraint on the ability 
of companies like Google and Facebook to petition the government. Nor 
would it prevent the big tech companies from engaging in political expres-
sion or from saying or not saying anything they liked in public. Instead, like 
other procompetition regulatory interventions in the marketplace, dives-
titure would further constitutional values by preventing companies like 
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Google and Facebook from using their economic might to drown out other 
voices. It seems incredibly unlikely, as a result, that any court would find 
that Congress lacked the constitutional power to enact divestiture along the 
lines that Warren and others suggest.
The same is not necessarily true of the other regulatory tools that schol-
ars and policymakers have proposed as a solution to the problems that 
plague the platform public sphere. This includes Warren’s suggestion that 
large internet platforms like Amazon and Google not only should be bro-
ken up, but services like Google Search also should be required to “meet a 
standard of fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory dealing with users.”21 
Nondiscrimination obligations are a core feature of public utility regulation 
in the United States.22 By including a nondiscrimination requirement in her 
breakup plan, Warren is clearly signaling that she believes the concentrated 
power of the tech giants needs to be combatted not only by the antimonopoly 
tool of antitrust but also by the antimonopoly tool of public utility regulation. 
She is not alone in this belief. In the past few years, a number of scholars 
and policymakers—many of them participants in this symposium—have 
suggested that Facebook, Amazon, and Google be treated as public utilities 
and regulated accordingly.23 
One can well understand why. After all, public utility laws are designed 
to protect the public’s right of access to important goods and services—to 
goods and services that one must have access to if one wishes to participate 
fully in society.24 It should be obvious to all by now that the goods and ser-
vices that platform companies like Google and Facebook provide are goods 
of this kind.25 It is perfectly plausible, as a result, to believe that the concerns 
that justify the imposition of nondiscrimination obligations on railroads 
and airlines and telephone companies also apply to platform providers like 
Google and Facebook. Doing so would certainly further many of the same 
interests that breaking up these companies would further. Like divestiture, it 
would help ensure the inclusiveness of the platform public sphere by making 
it harder for the big tech companies to use their economic power to squelch 
disfavored voices and viewpoints. Imposing on Facebook and Google and 
other platform providers a duty of fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory 
dealing would also provide regulators a legal hook they could use to regulate 
the operation of these companies in all sorts of other ways. The public utility 
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model is, for that reason, a very attractive one to those who believe that the 
unregulated power of the tech giants poses a real threat not only to public 
discourse but to democracy more broadly. It is generative, open-ended, and 
dynamic. 
There is, nevertheless, a serious problem with the idea of turning plat-
form companies like Facebook and Google into public utilities and requiring 
them to provide nondiscriminatory access to consumers: doing so would 
almost certainly be considered a violation of their First Amendment rights. 
This is because, unlike the private companies that in the past have been 
considered public utilities, companies like Google and Facebook engage 
in pervasive editorial regulation of the speech that flows through their net-
works.26 And yet the Supreme Court has, for over 30 years now, held that 
private property owners who exercise editorial control over speech that takes 
place on their property cannot ordinarily be required to open that property 
to speech they dislike.27 
The Court has only allowed the government to require property owners 
to open up their property to others’ speech when there is good reason to 
believe that doing so is necessary to prevent the property owner from exer-
cising bottleneck control over an important medium of communication. One 
could try to argue that Facebook and Google possess bottleneck power of 
that sort, but it would be hard to make the argument a convincing one, par-
ticularly if these companies get broken up.28 Even if they don’t, the argument 
would be a tough sell. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC—the most 
recent case in which the Court upheld a forced access law—the Court relied 
heavily on evidence that in 99 percent of communities in the United States, 
the local cable company possesses a total monopoly on the provision of 
cable service to justify a law requiring cable companies to devote a number of 
their cable channels to transmitting the content of local broadcast television 
networks.29 That the local broadcast television industry was, in significant 
parts of the country, utterly dependent for its survival upon the willingness 
of cable companies to carry its programming—and more specifically, upon 
the fact that cable operators exercised “control over most (if not all) of the 
television programming that is channeled into the subscriber’s home [and 
could] thus silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the 
switch”—justified, the Court asserted, the constraint the law imposed on 
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their editorial freedom.30 Facebook and Google may be dominant platforms, 
but they do not enjoy anywhere close to this level of dominance. There is no 
switch they can flick that can prevent disfavored speakers from disseminat-
ing their message on other, less dominant platforms. Particularly with Justice 
Kavanaugh on the Court, it is extremely unlikely that any effort to impose 
a nondiscrimination obligation on platform companies would be upheld 
against the First Amendment challenge that would be virtually certain to 
be forthcoming.31
The upshot is that neither of the two antimonopoly tools that scholars 
and policymakers have proposed in recent years as solutions to the eco-
nomic as well as political and cultural problems created by the rise of big 
tech will be able to do much to improve the quality of discourse within the 
platform public sphere. Breaking up big tech may help spur innovation and 
foster competition, but it won’t do much to alter the conditions under which 
speech occurs. Imposing a rule of nondiscriminatory access on the big tech 
companies, meanwhile, would alter the conditions of at least some aspects 
of the platform public sphere, by making it much more difficult for platforms 
to kick speakers off of their platform or to deny them access in the first place. 
But it is almost certainly precluded by the First Amendment, at least as the 
First Amendment is currently understood.
This doesn’t mean that there is nothing that lawmakers can do to 
improve the quality of public discourse on the internet or to ensure equitable 
access to the platform public sphere. But it does mean that they cannot rely 
on antimonopoly tools to do so. So what is to be done? In the remainder of 
this essay, I briefly suggest three regulatory interventions that would do more 
to directly tackle the problems of public discourse in the internet age than 
the mechanism of divestiture but that would not create the constitutional 
problems that a nondiscriminatory access rule would create.  
NEWSPAPER SUBSIDIES
Perhaps the easiest (although certainly not the cheapest) way that Congress could mitigate the democratic harms created by the economic and cultural dominance of the large platform companies is 
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to subsidize other, more traditional platforms for expression—namely, local 
newspapers. Local newspapers obviously do not provide the same oppor-
tunity for public expression as platforms like Facebook and Google do. But 
they serve another important public function: They uncover and disseminate 
information about local events, scandals, and problems.32 The steady flow 
of advertising money from local newspapers to the platform companies has 
and surely will continue to contribute to the creation of a public sphere in 
which there is a great deal of opinion but relatively little fact.
Congress can do something about this by granting a sizable mone-
tary subsidy for local newspapers. National newspapers like The New York 
Times and The Washington Post don’t need subsidizing because they have 
managed to transition to a subscription-based business model.33 But local 
newspapers do need help. 
A subsidy to established local news providers would not solve the root 
problem plaguing local news: namely, the transformation of the advertis-
ing industry on which the news industry has long relied for its economic 
sustenance. But it would help at least slow down the bleeding until a new 
economic model can be found. Certainly, the history of the newspaper indus-
try in the United States demonstrates how generative federal newspaper 
subsidies can be. The significant postal subsidies that Congress granted 
newspapers beginning in the late 19th century produced a country that, by 
1820, had both more post offices and more newspapers per capita than any 
other nation in the world.34 This in turn fostered a remarkably integrated 
and dynamic media landscape.35 The government continued to subsidize 
mail throughout the early 20th century but, since the 1960s, has significantly 
decreased the size of the postal subsidies.36 In 2010, the Federal Trade Com-
mission raised the possibility of increasing the size of the federal press 
subsidies by millions of dollars but has not moved forward on the idea since 
then.37 It easily could. 
Subsidies pose no constitutional problem. They do not infringe anyone’s 
First Amendment rights, so long as they are applied in a viewpoint-neutral 
manner.38 And they represent a much better solution to the problems facing 
the local news media than the solution that large newspaper businesses like 
News Corp have advocated, which is to grant newspapers a temporary immu-
nity from antitrust laws.39 Antitrust immunity tends to favor large industry 
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players, for obvious reasons.40 It would thus do little to help the newspapers 
that are most at risk in a media landscape dominated by big tech. Targeted 
subsidies are a much better way to go, even if enacting them might be more 
politically difficult because of the costs they impose.
As this discussion suggests, federal media policies should take account 
of the harmful effects that concentrated economic power can have on the 
public sphere. But this concern need not always make itself felt by means 
of the classic tools of antimonopoly law. 
PRIVACY REGULATION
In addition to subsidizing the traditional news media, Congress could restrict what platform companies do with the information they gather about their users’ browsing, shopping, and searching habits. 
Limiting the platforms’ ability to store and disseminate the information that 
they gather about their users would not only promote individual privacy 
interests; it would also help ensure broad participation in the platform 
public sphere by preventing those who wish to visit politically unpopular 
sites or engage in dissident speech or association from being chilled by the 
fear of surveillance.
There is growing evidence that fears of online surveillance impact the 
willingness of users to participate in online discourse—particularly on con-
troversial political topics.41 At least some users of platform services believe 
that there is enough of a risk of negative consequences from expressing a 
potentially controversial view to stay quiet. These fears are not irrational. As 
Zuboff and others have documented, the big tech companies have a close 
and complicated relationship with the institutions that make up the national 
security state and frequently share user data with them (not always involun-
tarily).42 Recent incidents in which journalists critical of the Trump admin-
istration’s immigration policies were stopped and questioned at the border 
demonstrate vividly how this data can be, and perhaps has been, used not 
only to investigate national security threats but to target those who criticize 
the government or express politically unpopular views.43 This is precisely 
the kind of state action the First Amendment was enacted to prevent, but 
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current First Amendment doctrine makes it virtually impossible for those 
chilled by the threat of surveillance to bring a constitutional claim.44 
There is consequently a good free speech argument, as well as a good 
privacy argument, for strengthening the (currently very weak) laws that 
govern how the government acquires and uses this kind of data and when 
and how the companies can disseminate it. Reforms of this sort could do a 
lot more than divestiture to ensure that the platform public sphere is robust, 
diverse, and inclusive. 
Nor would strengthened privacy laws cause the kind of First Amend-
ment problems that imposing a nondiscrimination access requirement on 
the big tech companies would. This is because, as the Court has made clear 
in numerous opinions, laws that restrict the collection and dissemination 
of information do not violate the First Amendment when they reasonably 
further a substantial government interest, when they are employed in a 
viewpoint-neutral manner, and when the information they restrict relates 
to private matters—“domestic gossip,” say, or “trade secrets”—rather than 
to matters of public concern.45
 This is true notwithstanding the Court’s 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, Inc. to strike down a Vermont law that prohibited pharmacies from 
selling to pharmaceutical marketers information about doctors’ prescribing 
habits without the doctors’ consent.46 Some have interpreted the decision in 
Sorrell to mean that all restrictions on the dissemination and sale of private 
information will be considered presumptively invalid or close to it.47 But in 
fact, Sorrell articulates a much narrower rule, namely that laws that restrict 
the dissemination of private information in order to target particular kinds 
of speakers must be closely scrutinized.48 
What this means for user data is that Congress should be able to justify 
relatively easily laws that restrict the uses that the big tech companies can 
make of it and with whom it can be shared. Such laws, after all, would clearly 
further the government’s substantial interests in individual privacy and 
in freedom of speech. The information they would regulate, meanwhile— 
information about what websites users search for, what kinds of shoes they 
like to buy, or who is in their friend network—may possess great commercial 
significance to advertisers, but in its discrete particularity is unlikely to be 
of broad “public concern.” Consequently, so long as Congress enacted a 
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general enough privacy law—one that did not, like the law struck down in 
Sorrell, limit the ability of the big tech companies to disseminate the infor-
mation they possessed to only certain users—the First Amendment should 
not constrain its powers.
There is no need, in other words, to rely on corporate self-regula-
tion—or, alternatively, to rely on the law of fiduciary obligations—to protect 
user privacy and, along with it, the vitality of the platform public sphere.49 
Fears of the First Amendment when it comes to privacy regulation have been 
greatly overblown, as the cases handed down since Sorrell make quite clear.50 
The First Amendment does make it exceedingly difficult for the government 
to force businesses to open up their property to speech they dislike, but it 
does not prevent the government from requiring businesses to protect the pri-
vacy of those to whom they voluntarily agree to provide services. Presumably 
this is because the Court thinks of the former kind of state action as posing a 
much more serious threat to the operation of the marketplace of ideas than 
the latter. We may agree or disagree, but what it means, practically, is that 
Congress has a good deal of power to affect the conditions of discourse on 
the platform public sphere by enacting viewpoint-neutral privacy laws—laws 
that give individuals some degree of knowledge and control over the data that 
the big tech companies possess about them and the uses to which it is put. 
TARGETED SPEECH REGULATIONS
Finally, Congress or state legislatures could make the platform public sphere a less threatening or dangerous place by enacting targeted speech regulations that make it either unlawful 
or expensive for the big tech companies to host threatening or harassing 
speech on their platforms. Legislatures have, in fact, already done so—as of 
this writing, the dissemination of nonconsensual pornography is a criminal 
offense in 46 states and the District of Columbia, and similar legislation has 
recently been introduced in Congress.51 Congress also recently limited the 
broad immunity that internet companies possess under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act from liability for speech that appears on their 
platforms to exclude speech that promotes prostitution or sex trafficking.52 
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This revision to the scope of Section 230 may only be the first of many; in a 
moment when many believe that the big tech companies possess too much 
power, Section 230 is a popular target for legislative reform.53
This kind of targeted speech regulation is of course precisely the kind of 
thing one might hope to avoid by engaging in more structural or “infrastruc-
tural” reform of the internet ecosystem—reforms, like the antimonopoly tools 
discussed earlier, that reshape the conditions under which speech occurs, 
rather than target that speech itself.54 But, as the earlier discussion makes 
clear, it simply may not be possible for structural reforms to solve all of the 
problems that plague the platform public sphere. The problems of racial 
hatred or sexual violence may simply be too pervasive to be solved by the 
mechanism of competition. Lawmakers who want to prevent (for example) 
the serious economic or reputational harms that the public circulation of 
sexually graphic images can cause may therefore have no choice but to 
target the speech directly.55 The same is true for those concerned about the 
problems caused by threats of violence on the internet.
Efforts to regulate speech directly will obviously raise all sorts of First 
Amendment questions. Laws that restrict speech because of its harmful 
content are typically considered presumptively invalid under the First 
Amendment. That presumption is rebuttable, however, if the government 
can demonstrate a sufficiently compelling reason for the law—and it doesn’t 
apply at all to unprotected speech like true threats. This explains why courts 
have long upheld the federal threats statute as applied to threats made on the 
internet. It also explains why just a few months ago, the Vermont Supreme 
Court upheld the state’s nonconsensual pornography law against a First 
Amendment challenge.56 There is therefore opportunity for legislators to 
regulate these and other kinds of harmful speech on the internet more inten-
sively than harmful content has been regulated in the past. 
This does not mean, of course, that doing so is normatively desirable. 
That is a far more complicated and context-specific question than can be 
answered in general—and certainly not in this essay. I will simply note 
that, when assessing it, policymakers and scholars should keep in mind 
not merely the benefits and harms of the speech in question but also the 
particular conditions under which speech on the internet occurs. One of 
the profound changes that the emergence of the platform public sphere has 
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brought about is a significant democratization of the opportunity to engage 
in public expression. The result is to increase tremendously the range of 
speakers—and speech acts—that circulate publicly. This is obviously both a 
good and a bad thing; it energizes and empowers but it also makes possible 
all kinds of hateful, harassing, and demeaning speech. It also raises the costs 
of enforcing any criminal or, for that matter, civil regulation of speech. And 
it heightens the possibility—present whenever the government regulates 
speech—that laws intended to remove violent or harassing or derogatory 
speech from the internet will in fact be used to punish politically unpopular 
speakers, rather than the worst kinds of speech. 
This suggests that whatever targeted speech regulation is enacted should 
be narrow in its scope, to help ensure that the government’s coercive power 
is wielded against the worst of the worst rather than against the politically 
vulnerable. What this means, in turn, is that even targeted regulation of 
speech will only be able to do so much to improve the conditions of discourse 
on the internet. It may, however, be the best that regulators can do, absent 
the kind of cultural and political change that creates and alters speech norms 
and the conditions of production on the internet. 
CONCLUSION
There is no question that the First Amendment—particularly as it is currently understood—makes regulating the platform public sphere more challenging, even when what those regulations seek to 
do is the same thing the First Amendment is supposed to do: namely, create 
a public sphere that is “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”57  We may not 
like this aspect of contemporary First Amendment law but it is something 
that is unlikely to change any time in the near future. 
What that means is that some regulatory tools—the tool of public utility 
regulation, for example—may be poorly suited to the challenges of our con-
temporary moment (challenges that are legal, as well as economic, social, 
and political). That may not mean we want to give up on them. Perhaps it 
is First Amendment law that ultimately has to change, and not our regu-
latory ambitions. Nevertheless, this essay has pointed to some important 
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alternatives that may be available even notwithstanding the current, highly 
deregulatory approach of First Amendment law. It is important to keep them 
in mind if we want to have both freedom of speech and freedom to regulate.
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